The Washington Post is illustrating again why journalist majors should avoid trying to think when reporting and listen to the experts. In this piece the reporter is trying to communicate an interesting new twist in the relationships between the militias and the radical insurgents. The news is there is a split happening, a parting of the ways:

In the void forged by the sectarian tensions gripping Baghdad, militias are further splintering into smaller, more radicalized cells, signifying a new and potentially more volatile phase in the struggle for the capital.

Emphasis mine. The ‘potential’ here is in the naive imagination of the reporter. I went to this article because it seemed to defy logic. When an enemy splinters it is a good thing (thus the title of this post). I realized that, for militants to separate from the militias, there had to be a parting of the ways. The Militia must have been moving towards reconciliation with the democratic government, why else part ways? And I know for a fact that to reduce your numbers reduces your capability. And so I was not surprised to find my suspicions included in the article and simply dismissed as the reporter tried lamely to be an expert on strategy and tactics. For example, here is the military’s response to the fracturing:

“In some ways it makes it easier for me because I have digestible doses I can deal with that might not be reinforcing one another,” a senior U.S. military official said at a recent briefing with reporters, speaking on condition of anonymity. “But at the same time, it creates problems for me because it is harder to find them when they are splintered, to identify who they are.”

Yes, pros and cons. But the pros outweigh. A small group can only control a small area. They can only intimidate so many people. And they cannot be as effective in any of these without the force multiplier of numbers. So while the effort to find a group of two verses 200 is harder, the group of 2 is much more exposed to those who want them gone. And that is the key. The domain of violence will be shrinking as the militias and these radicals part ways.

The new breed of militias embody the changed texture of violence in the fourth year of war — from attacks against Baathists and loyalists of former Iraqi president Saddam Hussein, to attacks on average Iraqis purely because of their sect or their wealth. They appear more localized and more ruthless than their predecessors. They deploy death squads and explode bombs to destroy houses. They have carved neighborhoods into fiefdoms, governing through fear and intimidation.

The strategy of setting up a small fiefdom is suicide. These people go from free flowing bandits to a group of targets nailed down to their enclave of control. They have walled themselves into a corner.

In every challenge there are things called ‘tall poles’ those big items you have to get out of your way to succeed. But when you whack down a couple of 20′ poles, you find your faced with about a dozen 10′ poles. You then get to work on these. Once done, you might find a dozen 4′ poles. And you get to work on these. The shorter the pole the easier to deal with, but the smaller problems always outnumber the bigger challenges. But as some point your just cruising and shaving down poles to your level of ‘polish’, where you can say these stubs we can deal with. This phenomena of problem solving is not apparent to journalists, who do not solve problems, they just go on about them. So I am not surprised this reporter did not understand what was unfolding in front of him

The fragmentation poses new obstacles to U.S. and Iraqi forces trying to quell the sectarian strife that U.S. commanders fear could plunge the nation into civil war. Militias have already replaced the Sunni Arab insurgency as the biggest challenge to U.S. efforts to bring stability to Iraq. Senior U.S. military officials privately acknowledge they do not have the manpower to conduct urban sweeps in every neighborhood or prevent areas they have cleared from again becoming havens of lawlessness and killing.

The fragmentation poses new obstacles to U.S. and Iraqi forces trying to quell the sectarian strife that U.S. commanders fear could plunge the nation into civil war. Militias have already replaced the Sunni Arab insurgency as the biggest challenge to U.S. efforts to bring stability to Iraq. Senior U.S. military officials privately acknowledge they do not have the manpower to conduct urban sweeps in every neighborhood or prevent areas they have cleared from again becoming havens of lawlessness and killing.

Note the ‘replacement’ comment. The AQ insurgency was the big pole that needed to be dealt with. As that pole has been cut down to size the next set of poles became apparent – the militia. But as they are dealt with, the next set of poles is now visible – these small pockets of ex-militia still hungry for blood. The journalist sees increasing problems because of numbers. But many of us know better, and see the establishment of clear progress and the path to an Iraq where we can depart as a result of success, not surrender.

Addendum: The reporter had to ‘hide’ the reason for the splintering in the second page, burrying the key fact:

One reason for the militia splintering is that differences have emerged within Sadr’s movement over his decision to join Iraq’s political process. The senior coalition intelligence official said he knew of at least “six major players” who have left Sadr’s movement because they no longer find him radical enough and see him as “too accommodating to the coalition.”

Divide and Conquer. Oldest play in the book of war. And don’t think we have to do the conquering:

“They will execute operations and obtain funding under the guise of Jaish al-Mahdi,” said the senior coalition intelligence official, using the Arabic name for the Mahdi Army. “But they are effectively beyond his control,” he said, referring to Sadr.

These groups represent a threat to Sadr’s image and political aspirations at a time when he controls four government ministries and 30 seats in the Iraqi parliament.

Sadr knows these people, where they are, etc. When they become a political liability, who do you think will have the most incentive to take them out?