By now, most interested parties know about the 2000 conclusion of ‘Able Danger,’ a covert US intelligence team—now disbanded–which postulated at that time that Mohammed Atta and three of the other perpetrators of the September 11, 2001 attacks o…

I thank you for the long posting, but there is a critical flaw in Slate’s logic.

The problem is in their analogy of Weldon’s claim’s about a possiblility of Bin Laden’s where abouts verses easily validated events of record. While Bin Laden’s supposed location in Iran may be based on speculation and suspect sources, the fact that Able Danger had the four, now known, terrorists tagged in 2000 or earlier is not speculation or based on sources. It is a record of fact (or else there would be no story and no willingness by now nearly 10 intelligence officers in coming forward).

Therefore there is no speculation – which is the Slate example. 9-11 Commission staffers admit now they were informed of these events, and the Able Danger group has the records to prove it no doubt. And this is why I suspect the Sandy Burger actions tie in – because this information possibly went up to Clark and the NSC level before the word came down to drop the probe on Atta. That last bit is my speculation as to how far the information travelled out into the administration before it returned with a ‘no go’ order.

But the report was made and the order to stop issued.

Therefore the alert and the orders to back off should be a matter of record.

Let Slate be confused if they need to rationalize this away, but they have no case whatsoever.

His piece is linked to numerous others so those interested may want to read it at Slate.com.

http://www.slate.com/id/2124223/?nav=navoa

He writes:

“Relying on Representative Curt Weldon, R-Pa., and a “former defense intelligence official,” the NYT says above the fold on Page One that a secret Pentagon program actually pegged four of the 9/11 hijackers—including Mohamed Atta—as al-Qaida men back in 2000. The secret program, which used data-mining, defined as the nontrivial extraction of implicit, previously unknown, and potentially useful information from data, was called “Able Danger.” Again, according to Weldon and the other source, program officials wanted to pass along the tips to the FBI but were overruled by Pentagon lawyers concerned that the military would be overstepping its authority. “We knew these were bad guys, and we wanted to do something about them,” the former unnamed DoD official said. That source also charged that the 9/11 commission was told about the scoop but never followed up.

Now to the wrinkles in the NYT’s piece: This is the first time the story has hit the big time, but it’s been around for at least a few months. As the Times mentions, Weldon actually spoke about the whole deal publicly back in June in a “speech on the House floor.” The allegations were picked up only in Weldon’s local paper and then recently in more depth by an industry magazine. Presumably, there are only two explanations for this: 1) Other reporters just blew it and didn’t notice. 2) They did notice but didn’t buy it.

Which brings us to the next wrinkle: As the Times mentions in passing, Weldon has a reputation for relying on iffy sources. He recently wrote a much-panned book alleging all sorts of Iranian plots, including that Tehran is hosting Bin Laden. The book relied on one source—a source one CIA official told the Times “was a waste of my time and resources.” A “fabricator” recalled another former spook. (The American Prospect has more on Weldon’s source troubles.)

As for the former unnamed defense official, he talked to the NYT while “in Mr. Weldon’s office.” And given the allegations being made, the Times offers a loopy explanation for why the former official isn’t named: “He did not want to jeopardize political support and the possible financing for future data-mining operations by speaking publicly.” (If his accusations are true, how would his being named undercut future data-mining efforts?)

So, what we have in the NYT are allegations by a congressman known to make wildly dubious claims, and one former defense official who backs up the congressman but for some reason declines to put his good name to the … facts. On the other side, you have—as the Times mentions up high but only details in, oh, the 29th paragraph—the 9/11 commission insisting that they did look into the program and found nothing.

Papers should give articles prominence commensurate with the level of confidence they have in the story’s sources—obviously. Today’s Papaers has no idea whether the major allegations in the above piece are accurate. Does the NYT?”

AJStrata has the scoop on yet another story that illustrates how close we had been to preventing 9/11 if red tape could have been replaced with better cooperation. It is certainly borderline infuriating (hell, infuriating, period) how much informatio…